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Abstract 
Who should be the author(s) of an academic paper? This question is becoming 
increasingly pressing, due to the increasing prevalence and scale of scientific 
collaboration, and the corresponding diversity of authorship practices in different 
disciplines and subdisciplines. This paper addresses the conceptual issues 
underlying authorship, with an eye to ameliorating authorship practices. The first 
part of the paper distinguishes five roles played by authorship attributions: 
allocating credit, constructing a speaker, enabling credibility judgements, 
supporting accountability, and creating an intellectual marketplace. The second part 
of the paper argues that distinguishing these functions helps us see that at least some 
of the confusions around authorship are due to tensions between these functions. 
The final part of the paper suggests a way to resolve these conceptual confusions, 
which we will call the CSWG proposal. This proposal suggests replacing authorship 
with a bundle of roles tailored to the functions of authorship—contributor, 
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1. Introduction 
Who should be the author(s) of an academic paper? This problem is pressing: both the 
prevalence of co-authorship and the number of co-authors listed on each paper are dramatically 
increasing.1 In May 2015 a paper giving an improved measurement of the mass of the Higgs 
Boson by CERN was published by Physical Review Letters (Aad et al. [2015]). This paper 
listed 5,154 authors, a significant number of whom were deceased at the time of publication. 
This list was derived from the members of the ATLAS and CMS projects, many of whom did 
not contribute to the research or writing, or even read the paper. There is also an increasing 
diversity in authorship practices: some disciplines list authors alphabetically [Waltman 
unpublished] or randomly [Ray ® Robson 2018], others by amount of contribution, others by 
seniority, while others give special significance to certain positions (typically first, second, and 
last positions). Some disciplines (especially in the humanities) list only the person who has 
done most work as an author, others list everyone in the organisation, lab, or project meetings 
irrespective of whether they have done any work on the paper, and others list the collaboration 
 
1 (Cronin [2001], Wuchty et al. [2007], West et al. [2013], Sonnenwald [2007], Sooryamoorthy 
[2009], Morrison et al. [2003], Larivivière et al. [2006], Mallapaty [2018], Ioannidis et al. [2018]). 
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as a collective author.2 In many disciplines (especially in interdisciplinary collaborations) it 
will be unclear or indeterminate what the norms for ascribing authorship are. 
 Researchers have identified a number of problems caused by the combination of scale of 
collaborations and diversity of authorship practice: i) confusion around disciplinary norms 
(Street et al. [2010], Mitcheson [2011], Macfarlane [2017]); ii) deliberate flouting of 
disciplinary norms (in a 2005 survey of NIH grant-holders 10% of respondents admitted 
assigning authorship inappropriately (Martinson et al. [2005], see also Pignatelli et al. [2005], 
Rohwer et al. [2017])), iii) the emergence of ghost authors (writers who are not listed as 
authors, often to hide commercial interests) who haunt as much as a fifth of papers in medical 
journals (Wislar et al. [2011] see also Flanagin et al. [1998], Mowatt et al. [2002]); iv) a lack 
of consensus about how to resolve disagreements (Macfarlane [2017]); v) disagreements about 
authorship (Mitcheson et al. [2011]); and vi) problems in reading a byline (Shaw [2016]). 
Given these problems, it is no surprise that authors often make subversive and unruly 
authorship attributions (Penders and Shaw [2020]). 
 This profusion of approaches to authorship partly stems from its complex history. One 
part of the genealogy of authorship traces back to legal battles around intellectual property in 
seventeenth and eighteenth Century England (Foucault [1980], Chartier [2003], Johns [2003]). 
These legal arguments led to a Lockean conception of authorship, whereby a researcher 
acquired rights to a piece of writing by mixing her labour with publicly available ideas (Chartier 
[2003], pp. 17-20, Johns [2003], pp. 82-4). Another thread traces back to the Spanish 
Inquisition, which required books to be published with their authors’ names in order to 
facilitate the censorship of heretics (Foucault [1980], Chartier [2003], p. 21). Many of the 
features we associate with authorship—originality, peer review, the fragmentation of research 
into paper-sized pieces—were negotiated through the development of the contemporary 
scientific journal (Baldwin [2015], Csiszar [2018]). 
 What is to be done? Some suggest we ought to admit a category of collective author 
(Wray [2006], [2007], [2018], de Ridder [2014]) or even abandon the notion of authorship for 
certain kinds of collaborative work (Kukla 2012, Huebner et al. [2018]). Others suggest 
revising our concept of authorship (Rennie et al. [1997]), either by regimenting it, (ICJME 
[2018]), by supplementing it with more fine-grained roles (Mozilla [2018], CRediT [2018]), or 
by supporting it with contribution statements to papers (theBMJ [2018]) (we return to these 
proposals in section 4). 
 
 This paper focuses on conceptual issues surrounding authorship. Section 2 distinguishes 
several functions associated with the assignment of authorship. 3 These functions give us a job 
description against which we can assess authorship practices. Section 3 argues that the 
functions of authorship are in tension, meaning that no single status can address all of these 
 
2 See [The Combahee River Collective 1997], [Polymath 2012, 2014], [ATLAS Collaboration 2012], 
[International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium 2001]. On collective authorship in high-
energy physics, see (Knorr Cetina [1999], pp. 166-70, Galison [2003]). 
3 For overviews, see (Rennie and Flanigan [1994], Cronin [2001], Marušić et al. [2011]). 
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functions. Section 4 suggests that we respond to this situation by doing away with the status of 
author, replacing it with a number of different roles—Contributor, Writer, Spokesperson, and 
Guarantor—which split up the distinct roles hitherto associated with authorship. I call this the 
CWSG proposal. 
 
 A couple of clarificatory points: 
 
 We will be concerned with authorship for non-fiction papers published by academic 
journals, setting to one side authorship for fiction and artworks (Bacharach and Tollefsen 
[2010]), the responsibilities associated with pre-prints, and publication outside of academic 
journals. Many of our examples come from natural, medical, and cognitive sciences, but we 
are also concerned with authorship in the social sciences and humanities. We will also leave to 
one side the complex relation between authorship and copyright (Biagioli [2003], Fyfe et al. 
[2018]), and the hermeneutic functions of authorship in allowing the interpretation of texts 
(Barthes [1967]). 
 
 Ordinary language switches between two ways of thinking about authorship. Sometimes 
authorship is treated as if it were determined by who contributed to the research, and other 
times it is treated as a social fact bestowed by the act of being listed on the byline (Huebner et 
al. [2018], p.103).4 Consider two ways in which a researcher might articulate their indignance 
at being left off of the byline of a paper she has contributed to: 
 
1. I’m an author of that paper! (contribution view). 
2. I should be an author of that paper! (social fact view). 
 
 Our interest is in the normative question of who should be designated author of a given 
paper, so we will assume the social fact view of authorship.5 
 
 This paper lies within the scope of its own proposal, as the first page attests. Although 
the intellectual credit for this paper is distributed amongst a large group, one person has written 
it. The first-person pronoun throughout refers to the writer, who expresses their own beliefs, 
and takes all relevant intellectual responsibilities (to be discussed below). 
2 The Functions of Authorship 
 
We will focus on five functions played by authorship attributions: 
 
1. Allocating intellectual credit; 
2. Constructing a speaker; 
 
4 On the social fact view, listing someone as an author is something like an Austinian performative: it 
doesn’t describe someone as an author, it makes them an author (Austin [1962]). 
5 This choice has some costs, meaning that ‘ghost authors’ are not authors (Rennie and Flanagin 
[1994], Flagagin et al. [1998], Mowatt et al. [2002], Moffatt and Elliott [2007], Wislar et al. [2011], 
Moffatt [2013]). 
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3. Enabling credibility judgements; 
4. Supporting accountability; 
5. Creating an intellectual market. 
 
The evidence for these functions comes from a wide range of sources. In what follows, I will 
appeal to explicit authorship guidelines, the sociology of science, proposals to revise 
authorship, the history of authorship practices, epistemology, and economics. All of these 
functions are reflected in actual authorship practices—which is not to say that they reliably 




We think that something has gone wrong when someone gets left off of a byline, or gets lower 
billing than they ought to. Think of Rosalind Franklin’s work on the double helix structure of 
DNA (which lead to the famous ‘discovery’ paper authored by Crick and Watson), or Jocelyn 
Bell Burnell’s work on pulsars (which lead to a paper on which she was second author).7 In 
these cases, we might think that the byline goes wrong because it communicates something 
false about who contributed what to the paper. 
 
We can capture this idea by connecting authorship with intellectual credit as follows: 
Credit: Assigning someone the status of author on a paper is a way to attribute to them 
either full or partial intellectual credit for the intellectual achievement(s) of that paper. 
The idea is that assigning authorship constitutes recognition of intellectual achievement. This 
way of thinking about credit is closely connected to the way epistemologists think about 
knowledge as an intellectual achievement (Greco [2010], Sosa [2007]): just as an individual is 
creditworthy when they have brought about some valuable end by exercising their practical 
skills, so too a researcher is creditworthy when they have made an intellectually valuable 
contribution by exercising of their intellectual capacities. 
 It is important to bear in mind the differences between i) intellectual credit, ii) praise and 
blame for intellectual performance, and iii) social recognition for achievement. We can think 
of credit attribution as analogous to a gold star awarded in recognition of athletic achievement. 
In the right social context, the awarding of the star itself constitutes a kind of recognition of 
 
6 These functions can be seen as disambiguating the notion of responsibility as it applies to authorship 
(Shoemaker [2011], Dang [unpublished]). The credit function concerns the claims made in a paper 
being attributable to the authors, the speaker function concerns the authors being answerable for the 
claims made, and the accountability function concerns the authors being accountable for the claims 
made. 
7 Neither case is a simple exclusion. Franklin co-authored a paper reporting her results in the same 
issue of Nature as Crick and Watson (Franklin and Gosling [1953]), and Bell Burnell has stated that 
her second author position was consistent with norms of authorship in astrophysics (Bell Burnell 
[1977]). 
6 
achievement, independent of praise or social recognition. In this section, our focus is on the 
recognition of achievement, but we will return to praise and blame (2.4) and to social 
recognition (2.5) below. 
 According to the credit function, a byline should list the people whose efforts contributed 
to the intellectual achievement of the paper. This idea raises a number of difficult issues. 
 One issue is how to think about what achievement an academic paper makes. It is 
tempting to say that the intellectually creditworthy achievement is the headline claim. This 
would make authorship too capacious. Science is a cumulative endeavour, and researchers who 
have done the work that a paper builds on deserve some credit, but they should not be included 
as authors. We might think that this kind of intellectual dependence deserves citation, but not 
inclusion as author.8 I suggest that the achievement of a paper is the way it extends or 
systematises social knowledge, meaning that the authors are those who are creditworthy for the 
extension, leaving citation to pick up the work of acknowledging dependence on previous 
work. 
 A second issue concerns fairness in the allocation of credit. According to the credit 
function when people are left off the byline, they fail to receive recognition for their 
creditworthy achievements. Authorial exclusions often track peoples’ social identities, 
suggesting connections with epistemic injustice, epistemic oppression, and epistemic 
appropriation (Fricker [2007], Dotson [2014], Davies [2018]).9 Exclusion from the byline will 
track social identities which are negatively associated with academia or particular fields, 
including being female (especially in stem fields), being a person of colour, being non-
European, and being a member of an indigenous culture.10 Academic identities also create 
exclusions: junior researchers often don’t get credit, and technicians, editors, and reviewers are 
denied authorial credit.11 
 Besides wholesale exclusion, there are various ways the contributions of researchers can 
be under-appreciated. Researchers might be assigned a position on the byline which does not 
adequately recognize the degree of their contribution. Women are less likely than men to hold 
the prestigious last and first author positions in many fields (West et al. [2013], Larivière et al. 
[2013]), and there is a long history of failure to recognize women’s’ contributions to science 
(the so-called Matilda effect, see Rossiter [1993]).12 The significance of contributions can also 
be misconstrued by readers, especially when unclear authorship guidelines create leave space 
 
8 For a discussion of the epistemic functions of citation in acknowledging credit and constructing an 
intellectual conversation, see (Ahmed [2013], [2017], pp. 15-7, 148-58)  
9 On epistemic injustice in citation, see (McCusker [2019]), and for a general discussion of epistemic 
injustice in science, see (Grasswick [2017]). 
10 On authorship and indigenous knowledge, see (Jaszi and Woodmansee [2003]). 
11 Interestingly, in Germany in the eighteenth century writers, paper makers, typesetters, printers, 
proof readers, publishers and book binders were all listed, and seen as equally creditworthy. (Jackson 
[2003], p/ 122). 
12 See also (O’Connor and Rubin [2018], Bruner, and O’Connor [2018]) for a model that explains 
how unequal bargaining practices in negotiating author positions between majority and minority 
groups might develop without any explicit prejudice. 
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for stereotypes to do interpretative work. If it is unclear what ordering practice has been used 
to construct a byline, readers may read their assumptions into their assignment of credit, 
reading a last author with a non-English surname as least creditworthy, rather than as lab leader. 
The Matthew effect (Merton [1957], [1968], Zuckerman [1977], Strevens [2003])—whereby 
more senior or credible researchers are perceived as more creditworthy—can be compounded 
by social identity.13 When some authors are the target of a social stereotype which 
systematically downgrades their credibility, the Matthew effect means that their perceived 
credit may also be downgraded.14 
 A third issue is whether authorship is a recognition of specifically intellectual credit. 
Historically, authorial practices have often focused on intellectual labour, leading to ‘invisible 
technicians’ who are left out of the history of science. This phenomenon is particularly striking 
in Robert Boyle’s laboratory (Shapin [1989], [1995] Chapter 8): Boyle took sole authorship of 
all papers, despite his ‘laborants’ carrying out almost all of the administrative and experimental 
work. Associating authorship solely with intellectual labour is both unjust and difficult to 
justify. A practice of attributing credit solely focus on the kind of labour will have unjust 
consequences, including very small intellectual contributions while excluding very large 
practical contributions. The distinction between intellectual and practical labour is itself on 
shaky ground. One important upshot of the literature on knowledge-how is that all human 
activities involve a mixture of theoretical and practical knowledge (Snowdon [2004], Wiggins 
[2012]), and academic research is no exception. Many attempts to draw distinctions between 
‘intellectual’ and ‘practical’ endeavours are driven by ideological commitments (Stanley 
[2012], [2015], Kremer [2016]). These considerations suggest that both practical and 
intellectual labour ought to be creditworthy in the way that matters for authorship.15 
 A final issue concerns multiple authorship. We might think that designating a people as 
co-authors recognises a team which is collectively creditworthy.16 Understanding who is 
responsible in a team achievement is a complex question (van de Poel et al. [2015]). This issue 
is often fudged by saying that all co-authors must make significant contributions. This opens 
up the possibility of abuse. The context-sensitivity of ‘significance’ allow senior authors to 
raise the bar to exclude their colleagues’ work whilst making their contributions to planning 
and conception particularly salient.17 It is not obvious that small contributions are not 
creditworthy: if a piece of research involves thirty researchers who make small contributions, 
and one researcher who makes a large contribution, only including the ‘significant’ contribution 
would misrepresent the research.18 If all authors make small contributions to a paper, requiring 
significant contributions would lead to an orphan paper that could not have any authors 
 
13 For empirical evidence about a generalisation of the Matthew effect, see (Cole [1970]). 
14 For a related discussion about exclusion in publication, see (Tanswell et al. [2018]).  
15 It is not obvious that credit should be only assigned to human researchers. (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 
2010) interviews several bonobos, who are listed as authors. 
16 On collective achievement in testimony, see (Green [2012], [2014a], [2014b]). 
17 On abuses of context, see (Grindrod [forthcoming], Ichikawa [2020]). 
18 The 1014-author (Leung et al. [2015]) takes this idea to heart, including hundreds of undergraduate 
students as authors.  
8 
(Moffatt [2013]). 
I suggest that the credit function should be understood in an inclusionary way, meaning that 
anyone who has contributed any amount of practical or intellectual labour is creditworthy, and 
thus a candidate for being included as an author. 
2.2 Building a responsible speaker 
 
Besides distributing credit, authorship also functions to distribute intellectual responsibilities 
(Rennie and Flanigan [1994]), (Rennie et al. [1997]), (Biagioli [2003]). In order to understand 
the nature and source of these responsibilities, I suggest that we draw an analogy between 
publishing a paper in an academic journal and asserting a claim in a conversation. In this 
section, we focus on the way this analogy helps us to understand speaker-side responsibilities, 
and in the next two sections we will turn to credibility and accountability. 
 
 Making an assertion in a conversation involves putting forward some claim as true. When 
I say ‘last summer was the hottest ever’ I put the claim forward as true, and invite others to 
believe it. This speech act comes along with a bundle of responsibilities: 
 
i. Sincerity norm: the requirement that the claim expresses the speaker’s belief, and is 
not intended to mislead her audience. 
ii. Consistency and coherence norm: the requirements that the speaker not assert a claim 
and its negation, and that the total of her claims in a conversation are coherent. 
iii. Defend or retract norm: the requirement to either defend a claim as a conversation 
unfolds, or to retract it. 
iv. The Knowledge norm: the requirement that the speaker only asserts propositions she 
knows to be true. 
 
Although these norms are not universally accepted, for the purposes of this paper I will take 
them for granted.19 
 
 Our analogy presents publication as a kind of institutionally authorised assertion. When 
a paper involving multiple researchers is published in an academic journal, they perform a 
special act: with the authorisation of the journal they collectively assert all the claims made in 
the paper.  We might think that one of the functions of the byline is to construct a collective 
agent which can meet these norms. This suggests the following function: 
Speaker: a function of assigning a set of people as the authors of a paper is to create an 
 
19 There is a debate about whether the condition required for epistemic appropriateness is knowledge, 
rather than truth, justification, belief, or something else. I think that the case for the knowledge norm 
(see, Weiner [2017]) for scientific assertion is as good as anywhere. See (Gerken [2015]) for a 
defence of a justification norm in science (de Ridder 2014) for a defence of an understanding norm, 
and, (Fleisher [2018], [forthcoming]) for limited criticism of the knowledge norm, and (Dang and 
Bright [2021]) for criticism of belief, justification, and knowledge norms in science.  
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epistemically responsible speaker. 
This function is simple in the single author case, since they will take on all responsibilities. In 
the collective case there are a number of ways in which epistemic responsibilities can be 
divided up. To see how these options work, focus on the knowledge norm. 
 The knowledge norm requires that a speaker backs up their assertions with knowledge 
(Williamson [2001]). Applied to individual assertion, this gives the following norm: 
KNA: A speaker S must: assert that p, only if S knows that p. 
This rule doesn’t require the speaker to assert everything they know, it requires that when they 
assert, those assertions express knowledge. If they assert something false, or for which they do 
not have justification, they have done something epistemically wrong. This failure might be 
excusable, or justifiable on other grounds, but there remains something wrong with it. KNA 
applies to asserted content: a hedged claim like ‘probably p’ requires knowing that it is probable 
that p. 
 
 In a case where a group asserts a bunch of connected claims {p1, p2, … pn}, there are 
several ways KNA might be distributed: 
All: A group G must: assert that {p1, p2, … pn}, only if every member of G knows all 
of {p1, p2, … pn}. 
Distributed: A group G must: assert that {p1, p2, … pn}, only if each of the propositions 
in {p1, p2, … pn} are known by at least one member of G. 
One: A group G must: assert that {p1, p2, … pn}, only if one member S1 knows all of 
{p1, p2, … pn} 
Collective: A group G must: assert that p, only if G collectively knows that {p1, p2, … 
pn}20 
Different distributions of responsibility may be appropriate for different research cultures.21 
Highly collaborative research involving a small number of researchers might generate the 
expectation that all researchers to know all claims (All). With research involving a greater 
division of labour, we may allow that different researchers know the claims relating to different 
parts of the paper (Distributed), or expect one researcher to have an overview of the research 
 
20 These options could also be implemented by considering different understandings of group 
knowledge. See (Bird [2010], [2014]), (Lackey [2014]), (Habgood-Coote [2019]). 
21 Another possibility is that different norms relate to different kinds of collective assertion (Lackey 
[2018]). When a spokesperson asserts on behalf a group, we might get KNA-ONE (with the 
spokesperson being the appointed member), when the group engages in co-ordinated assertion, we get 
KNA-DISTRIBUTED, and when the group makes an assertion by means of all members making an 
assertion (think of the way that a collective assertion at a protest is constituted by many individual 
assertions with the same content) we might get KNA-ALL.  
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(One). As the size and complexity of research increases, we may instead expect the group to 
collectively know the claims in the paper (Collective) (Hardwig [1985], Galison [2003], pp. 
349-51, Huebner et al. [2018]). Other speaker-related norms can be distributed in similar ways: 
 
 Sincerity Consistency and 
Coherence 
Defend or Retract The Knowledge 
Norm 
All All agents 
must believe 
all claims 
All agents take 
responsibility for 
the coherence of 
the whole 
All agents must 
defend/ decide 
whether to retract 
All agents must 
know all claims 




All agents take 
responsibility for 
the coherence of 
their allocated 
parts 




All agents must 
know their 
allocated claims 
One One agent 
must believe 
all claims 
One agent takes 
responsibility for 
the coherence of 
the whole 
One agent must 
defend/ decide 
whether to retract 
One agent must 
know all claims 





for the coherence 
of the whole 
The collective 
must defend/ 
decide whether to 
retract 
The collective 
must know all 
claims 
Table 1:  Different ways to distribute speaker responsibilities in co-authorship. 
 
These norms  help us to think about a swathe of authorial practices. 
 
The sincerity norm helps us to think about what goes wrong in fraud. In fraud, a 
researcher will have made various claims which they do not believe, and the discovery of a 
fraud often attracts a moralised reaction. This kind of response is much like the response to the 
discovery of a lie, suggesting that lies and fraud both involve flouting the sincerity norm.22 
 
 
22 The lie need not be the headline claim: a researcher might create fraudulent data to support a true 
claim in the hope that others will replicate it (Hardwig [1991], p. 703). This is the pattern we find in 
the Schön case (Reich [2009]). 
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This sincerity norm also helps explains the connections between publication and belief. 
In some cases, bylines are constructed to indicate the strength of belief behind a claim. Consider 
the seventy-two authors of (Benjamin et al. [2018]), which proposes to change the default p-
value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005. In other cases authors seem to 
be governed by a collective interpretation of the sincerity norm. Some groups of co-authors 
seem to constitute a plural subject brought together by joint commitments (Gilbert [1987], 
[1989], [2004]) meaning that views expressed are those of the collective (Wray [2006], [2007], 
[2018]). In other cases authorship is only loosely connected to belief. Many of the authors of a 
CERN paper will not have read the paper, so cannot reasonably be taken to believe the headline 
claim, and there is an ongoing debate about whether publishing in philosophy requires belief 
(Plakias [2019], Fleisher [2020]). 
 
The consistency and coherence norm helps us to think about the norms of collective 
writing. Why can’t a team of researchers simply split up the paper into sections, and write those 
sections separately, in accordance with their own beliefs? Part of the answer is that authors are 
under an obligation to ensure that the papers they publish are consistent, and put forward a 
coherent point of view (Wray [2014], pp. 127-8 [2018], pp. 120-1, Bright et al. [2018], pp. 
240-1). When researchers get into a disagreement about a question relevant to their paper, they 
cannot simply report disagreement. They can either take up no position, try to reach a consensus 
position via debate, or reach compromise. Who takes responsibility for dealing with these 
situations will typically depend on the writing process: if the group is writing together, then 
they must collectively hash out a position, but if one researcher is writing on behalf of the 
group, then they need to resolve these. 
 
The defend or retract norm helps to understand the responsibilities of authors to defend 
their positions, and the importance of retracting papers. All authors will be under pressure to 
defend claims made in her papers in conversations, and there may be norms to publish 
collective responses to critical papers. Academic retraction is a complicated topic in its own 
right, but it does play a similar role to retraction in conversation. As with response papers, the 
expectation seems to be that all authors sign off on retraction notices, maintaining the integrity 
of the collective author.23 
2.3 Credibility judgements 
So far we have been focusing on the analogy between assertion and publication from the 
speaker’s side. Let’s now consider the reader’s perspective. Although the peer review system 
provides some default reason to take published papers seriously,24 there remains an important 
 
23 Here we are setting editorial retractions to one side (Wray [2018], p. 122). In a survey of retractions 
from Science, Wray and Andersen discovered that the majority of retractions (both in cases of mistake 
and fraud) are signed by the all authors, suggesting that authors continue to function as collectives 
(Wray and Andersen [2018], [2019], [unpublished]). 
24 How much trust we should place in peer review is a complex question, which will vary depending 
on journal practices, and norms of peer review in different subdisciplines. See (Heesen and Bright 
[forthcoming]) for a critique of peer review. 
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role for trust in the epistemology of scientific papers.25 Although the role of credibility 
judgements is particularly important for lay readers of scientific papers (Anderson [2011]), 
researchers must take some parts of a paper on trust (such as data collection), and trust claims 
outside of their expertise. 
 Our central tool for managing epistemic trust is credibility judgements. When someone 
asserts a claim, we may consider whether they are being sincere, their competence in the 
relevant domain, and whether their sincerity is based in their competence. Credibility 
judgments also help us in making judgements about what to read, allowing us to select papers 
most likely to be true (or at least interesting). 
 This suggests the following function: 
Credibility: the function of assigning a set of people as the authors of the paper is to 
enable readers to make judgements about how credible the results of the paper are. 
In the single author case this function is rather simple, but there are various different ways 
to assign credibility to a collective author: 
 Lead: give the paper a credibility rating identical to that of the lead author; 
 Average: give the paper a credibility rating corresponding to an average of the 
credibility of all authors; 
 Highest: give the paper a credibility rating corresponding to the author with the highest 
credibility; 
 Lowest: give the paper a credibility rating corresponding to the author with the lowest 
credibility. 
There will also be more complex procedures that pay attention to group-level 
phenomena, such as the reliability of the aggregation procedure used to reach a collective 
position (List [2005], Bright et al. [2018]). 
We might also appeal to other factors to assign credibility: 
Journal: give the paper a credibility rating corresponding to the reputation of the 
journal; 
Lab: give the paper a credibility rating corresponding to the reputation of the lab that 
 




Various other phenomena may play a role in determining the credibility-rating for a paper, 
including pre-registration of results, the presence of open science badges, the quality of peer 
review in the field, and what country the authors are working in. 
2.4 Accountability 
Associating authors with papers doesn’t just allow us to judge credibility; it also allows us to 
improve the quality of work. Having authors associated with a paper gives us a target for what 
we might think of as the epistemic reactive attitudes (Tollefsen [2017]), which encompass 
everything from the award of scholarly prizes to chiding a colleague for a shoddy work. Having 
a stable practice of praising and blaming gives all researchers social reasons to produce better 
work (Reynolds [2002], [2008], [2017], Bruner [2013]). If these community-level policing 
mechanisms are well-implemented, they may allow a default of trust in all work. 
 This suggests the following function: 
Accountability: the function of assigning a set of people as the authors of a paper is to 
create a target for praise if the paper is epistemically good, and censure if the paper is 
epistemically bad. 
As with the norms discussed in 2.2., there are various different ways to implement 
accountability: 
 All: hold every author accountable for every claim made in the paper; 
 One: hold one author accountable for every claim made in the paper; 
 Distributed: hold each author accountable for the claims they were responsible for; 
 Collective: hold the authors collectively responsible. 
These practices incentivise different patterns of epistemic conduct, and have different costs and 
benefits. Holding all authors responsible incentivises all authors to double check the whole 
paper, which will push up the quality of published papers, at the cost of epistemic labour. This 
is the practice prescribed by the ICJME guidelines (ICJME [2018]). The labour involved in 
ACC-ONE and ACC-DISTRIBUTED is somewhat lower, but they also incentivise less 
thorough checking. A practice of collective or institutional accountability can motivate 
institutions to create internal processes, such as internal peer review and quality control (see 
 
26 One might also wonder whether we can replace trust in individual researchers with trust in the 
collective processes of science (Kukla [2012]). On the importance of trust in individuals in science, 
see (Hardwig [1991], p. 704-9), (Frost-Arnold [2014]), (Wagenknecht [2014]). 
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Galison [2003], pp. 336-40). 
2.5 The scientific marketplace 
 
Although there are centrally planned elements of the scientific community (including 
government funding, and commercial research), for the most part researchers are free to self-
direct. Without explicit direction, we might think that science requires an incentive system to 
ensure that researchers produce socially useful knowledge in an efficient manner. It is plausible 
that market-style mechanisms will deliver this by incentivising individuals to work hard 
(Zollman [2018]), and leading to an efficient division of labour across projects (Kitcher [1990], 
Strevens [2001]). By itself, inquiry is poorly suited to market mechanisms, since it requires the 
investment of private goods (time, leisure, money) to produce a public good (knowledge). A 
set of scientists motivated only by truth would be subject to the public goods problem, leading 
to each individual defecting from the optimal distribution of labour (Dasgupta and David 
[1993], Stephan [1996], Zollman [2018]). 
 
 To address this problem, we need to introduce a private good into the system. We could 
just pay researchers money when they make discoveries,27 but it would be cheaper (as well as 
according better with researchers’ self-conception) to create a parallel economy of social credit. 
When a researcher publishes a paper, they get allocated social recognition based on having a 
publication. This recognition can then be used to leverage other private goods, including 
employment, promotion, patents, and academic prizes.28 
 
This suggests the following function for authorship attributions: 
Market: a function of assigning a set of people as the authors of a paper is to create a 
system of private goods which are apt for market mechanisms. 
This function draws our attention to the way social credit can create an incentive structure 
for academic research, but it does not by itself say anything about how this social credit is 
awarded. This is a big question. If joint-authored publications receive less social prestige than 
single-authored publications, researchers will be motivated to work alone. We ought also to 
worry about researchers manipulating the system (Kwok [2005], McElreath [2016], Heesen 
[2018]), and that different disciplines distribute credit in different ways, creating a set of 
overlapping marketplaces (Lee [2020]). 
 
27 Universities in China pay from $30,000 to $165,000 for publication in Web of Science indexed 
journals (Quan et al. [2017]), and an informal study by retraction watch found financial rewards in 
universities in Gulf states, South Africa, East Asia, Australia, and in the UK and US (Abritis et al. 
[2017]). 
28 This function opens up an interesting perspective on joining a laboratory that includes all members 
as authors. Alongside the productivity benefits, we might think of this kind of scheme as risk-pooling 
device in which one puts one’s labour into a common pool, and receives a share of the benefits. 
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3.Who Should be an Author? 
Our discussion has distinguished a family of functions for authorship practices: the credit 
function, the speaker function, the credibility function, the accountability function, and the 
market function. The ideal would be to find a practice of ascribing authorship which could 
simultaneously play all of these roles. In this section, I argue that this aspiration cannot be 
fulfilled. The different functions answer a number of questions in incompatible ways: 
 
1. Should researchers be authors on papers whose results they don’t believe? 
2. Can the author list of a paper be manipulated to boost its credibility? 
3. Should invisible technicians and ghost authors be included as authors? 
4. Can we assign authors for massively collaborative work? 
3.1 Credit and belief 
Consider the following situation: a large group of researchers has put a considerable amount 
of work into an experiment, producing a large data-set which has potential to be used for many 
different purposes (think of a longitudinal population study, or experimental work in high-
energy physics). One member of the team draws on this work to support a controversial claim, 
which many others believe to be false. Who should be listed as an author on the paper detailing 
these controversial results? 
 According to the credit function, authorship should respond to the labour which went 
into the production of the paper, and all researchers who have put in intellectual or practical 
work should be listed as authors. The disbelieving authors might be disgruntled by this 
proposal, being unwilling to stake their reputations on this controversial claim. The 
disbelieving researchers might leverage the speaker function (focusing on the sincerity norm 
applied as ALL) or the credibility function to argue they should not be authors. In this situation, 
considerations of credit makes one prediction about who ought to be an author, and the speaker 
and credibility functions make an opposing prediction. 
3.2 Manipulating credibility 
 
Consider the following dilemma, identified by a Nobel prize winner interviewed by Harriet 
Zuckerman: 
You have a student; should you put your name on that paper or not? You’ve contributed 
to it, but is it better that you shouldn’t or should? There are two sides to it. If you don’t 
[and here comes the decisive point on visibility], if you don’t , there’s the possibility 
that the paper may go quite unrecognised. Nobody reads it. If you do, it might be 
recognised, but then the student doesn’t get enough credit. (Zukerman [1977], quoted 
in Merton [1968], p. 5) 
16 
 Here we find a tension between the desire to ensure that all contributors get adequate 
credit, and the desire that the paper be widely read and taken seriously. From the perspective 
of the credibility function, including the senior scientist is a good idea, since it will boost the 
credibility of the paper, allowing it to reach more people. But from the perspective of CREDIT, 
things are difficult: the inclusion of a senior researcher might lead to her student getting 
insufficient credit. 
 
Credibility can motivate both inclusion and exclusion. In inclusion cases, highly-regarded 
researchers are parachuted in at the last moment on a paper that they have done no work on to 
boost its credibility. From the perspective of the credibility function, this is a potentially helpful 
practice that ensures that good work gets read. However, from the perspective of the credit 
function, this bloating of the byline improperly represents the creditworthy work. 29 In 
exclusion cases, the byline of a paper is pared down to ensure that only credible researchers 
are left. This practice will be prevalent—and perhaps understandable—in conditions of 
widespread testimonial injustice (Fricker [2007]). We might think that the authorship practices 
of Robert Boyle and his contemporaries were in part a response to the culture of gentlemanly 
trustworthiness in early modern England. This culture associated trustworthiness with 
masculinised perceptual competence, Christian virtues, the disinterested attitude which 
presupposed financial independence, and a position in an aristocratic honour culture which 
assigned significant social costs to mendacity (Shapin [1995], p. 75-86). This epistemic culture 
made credibility in scientific matters the sole preserve of upper-class men, meaning that for 
experimental research to function in the seventeenth century credibility economy, Boyle had 
to transform the labour of paid laborants into the ‘testimony of a free and independent 
gentleman’ (Shapin [1995], p. 383). This practice of exclusion might be perfectly respectable 
from the perspective of credibility, but the credit function reminds us that it unfairly excludes 
creditworthy parties. In these cases, the credit and credibility functions pull in different 
directions. 
3.3 Invisible technicians 
A related tension between the credit and speaker functions shows up in cases where lots of 
people have contributed significant practical labour into a project which they do not fully 
understand. Consider Gaspard de Prony’s mathematical tables project, which employed 
political refugees and unemployed hairdressers as human computers to prepare tables of 
trigonometric and logarithmic functions (Grattan-Guiness [1990], Daston [1994], Grier [2005], 
 
29 (Strevens [2006]) suggests a potential resolution to the credibility-boosting case. We might think 
that putting one’s credibility behind a paper is itself a creditworthy move, meaning that the senior 
scientist who is included at the last moment is in fact creditworthy. If we buy this idea, we might 
think that credibility-boosting inclusion might be justifiable by the credit function. This idea doesn’t 
fully resolve the puzzle, because it fails to address credibility-motivated exclusion. Not being credible 
does not decrease one’s creditworthiness.  
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pp. 34-8).30 The workers carried out calculations by means of repeated operations of addition 
and subtraction, which Prony claimed was the extent of their mathematical knowledge. These 
human computers are plausibly due credit for the tables produced, but Huebner, Kukla, and 
Winsberg (HKW) claim that only Prony—perhaps together with the mathematicians who 
assisted him in setting the calculations—can claim authorship: 
[Only Prony and the Mathematicians] could vouch for the results of this massive 
collaboration; they were the ones who were epistemically accountable for producing 
accurate tables, defending them if challenged, and revising them if necessary. [. . .] In 
effect, the text was still single-authored [. . .] because one person retained centralised 
control over the research process, including its methodological standards and 
implementation. While many people participated in the production of knowledge, only 
one person has the status of the author of the document communicating that knowledge. 
(Huebner et al. [2018], pp. 98-9). 
Here HKW deploy several of the speaker norms, including the sincerity norm, the defend or 
retract norm, and the knowledge norm. They point out that because of the unequal nature of 
the collaboration, belief in the reliability of results, discursive responsibilities, and knowledge 
are all centralised, meaning that only Prony can fulfil the responsibilities associated with these 
norms. Whereas the credit function offers an inclusive and meritocratic picture of authorship 
for work that involves a division of labour, the speaker function offers an elite picture, 
associating authorship with epistemic responsibilities which may only be fulfillable by the 
managers of a project. 
3.4 Radically collaborative research 
The final dilemma concerns cases of radically collaborative research , which HKW argue 
involve a wholesale breakdown of authorship (Kukla [2012], Winsberg et al. [2014], Huebner 
et al. [2018], Winsberg [2018], Chapter 13). Radically collaborative research involves a high 
degree of specialisation and division of labour, a large number of collaborators working in 
different institutions around the world, and no centralised perspective that can synthesise the 
work of all of the researchers. HKW’s examples are multi-site biomedical trials, high-energy 
physics, and atmospheric climate modelling. HKW argue that these cases pose a fundamental 
challenge to our conception of authorship, because the lack of a centralised perspective means 
that there is no individual who can take responsibility for this work. On their view, no 
individual or group can claim authorship for this kind of research. 
 I think that HKW are half right. By the lights of the speaker and accountability functions 
no-one should be an author of papers produced by radically collaborative research. It will be 
impossible to find anyone to fulfil the knowledge-norm, who might ensure consistency, who 
might defend the research, and who might be accountable. However,  according to the credit 
 
30 Although these computers were mathematically illiterate, many people employed as human 
computers others were sophisticated researchers in their own right. For discussion of the computers at 
the Harvard College Observatory, see (Grier [2005] Chapters 4 and 5, Sobel [2017]). 
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function, authorship is straightforward: everyone who contributed to the project should be 
listed. This suggests that the speaker and accountability functions are also in tension with the 
credit function. 
4. The Death of the Academic Author 
The four tensions detailed in the previous section demonstrate that the different functions of 
authorship make different predictions about who should be an author, meaning that no rule for 
assigning authors to papers will be able to meet all of the functions of authorship. There are 
several ways we might try to move forward: 
 
1. Pick a set of coherent functions and design a practice for ascribing authorship that 
matches up with those functions; 
2. Accept the inconsistency, but allow researchers to continue to pick and choose 
which functions they want authorship to play; 
3. Try to design a new practice which preserves all of the functions of authorship 
whilst addressing their inconsistency.31 
 
The goal of the rest of the paper is to develop a version of the third strategy. I take it that all of 
the functions of authorship are important, making the first strategy unappealing. And the 
profusion of meanings for authorship allowed by the second strategy would do nothing to 
address the lack of clarity around authorship.32 At present, authorship is both confusing and 
inconsistent, and it would be good to address both problems by crafting an authorial practice 
which is clear and responsive to the different functions of authorship.33 
 
I suggest that we employ a divide and rule strategy that does away with the status of 
authorship, replacing it with several different statuses tailor-made for the different functions of 
authorship.34 Rennie, Yank, and Emmanuel make a similar proposal, suggesting that we replace 
authors with contributors (someone who has done relevant work), and guarantors (someone 
who takes responsibility for the integrity of the whole) (Rennie et al. [1997], pp. 582-3).35 I 
want to take things further, replacing authorship with four roles. Let’s call this revisionary 
proposal the CWSG proposal: 
 
The CWSG proposal: 
 
 
31 We might also explore proposals for anonymous (Hanel [unpublished]), or pseudonymous (Minerva 
[2014a], [2014b]) authorship practices, though these are motivated on rather different grounds. 
32 (Biagioli [2003]), (Rennie et al. [1997]). 
33 This is why I don’t think it would be sufficient to resolve the conflicts from section 3 by simply 
distinguishing two roles: contributor and writer-spokesperson-guarantor. By articulating more fine-
grained roles, we can be responsive to authors who are writers but not guarantors, and so on.  
34 For an analogous response to the incoherence of truth, see (Scharp [2013]).  
35 This radical promise has been dulled in implementation (see Rennie et al. [1997], p. 583). 
Biomedicial journals have kept the byline for authors (regulated by the ICJME guidelines), and 
included contribution statements and a guarantor at the end of the paper (see BMJ [2018]).  
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Papers should no longer be associated with authors, instead they should be 
associated with four roles: 
 
Contributor: someone who has contributed labour to the project, making them either 
fully or partially creditworthy for the achievement associated with the project. 
 
Writer: someone who contributes to the writing of the project 
 
Spokesperson: someone who takes responsibility for co-ordinating responses to 
criticisms of the paper, and retraction decisions. 
 
Guarantor: someone who gives their word that all the claims made in the paper are 
true. 
 
The credit function concerns the role played by authorship in the recognition of creditworthy 
work, and will be associated with the contributor role. This role is backward-looking: we can 
determine who should be a contributor by considering who put their labour in to the collective 
intellectual achievement of the paper. This role bundles together the byline and the 
acknowledgements of a paper, giving a full picture of the people who contributed to the paper. 
It should be unusual to see just one person listed as a contributor. It might be helpful to 
distinguish the credit associated with research from the credit for writing and guaranteeing. 
This allows us to more easily represent cases in which someone has come in after the research 
has been done to act as writer or guarantor. 
 
 The speaker function concerns the epistemic norms associated with publication: sincerity, 
consistency and coherence, the knowledge norm, and the defend or retract norm. Unlike the 
credit function, this is forward-looking. I propose that we split these norms in two. Sincerity, 
consistency and the knowledge norm are associated with the writing process: the researcher(s) 
who have taken a lead on pulling together individual contributions to yield a coherent whole 
are best placed to fulfil these norms. The defend or retract norm concerns the life of the paper 
post-publication, and is associated with long term responsibilities. I propose that we associate 
the role of writer with the norms of sincerity, consistency and coherence, and the knowledge-
norm, and the role of spokesperson with the defend or retract norm. These roles need not be 
played by the same people. 
 
 The credibility function concerns whose credibility is associated with a paper. Here the 
proposal gets a little more complex. Following Rennie, Yank, and Emmanuel, I propose a 
guarantor role: someone who guarantees the integrity of the whole piece of work. We can think 
of a guarantor functioning a little like book endorsements. The guarantor’s credibility allow us 
to use a single agent’s credibility for a paper, but we might want to allow for more complex 
credibility assignments that also look to the credibility of the contributors concerning their 
portions of the research. Perhaps the default should be that the primary credibility for entirety 
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of the paper is given by the guarantor’s credibility, but the secondary credibility for the parts 
of the paper is given by the credibility of contributors. 
 
 The accountability function concerns the targeting of reactive attitudes to motivate 
epistemically high-quality research. We have seen that there are a number of ways to hold 
researchers responsible. I propose a similar division of labour to that we saw with the credibility 
function. The guarantors of the paper should be held accountable for the entirety of the paper 
(one),36 and the contributors should also be held accountable for their own contributions 
(distributed). If one contributor has done poor work or lied, both they and the Guarantor(s) are 
to be held accountable for the failing. This gives us a similar distinction between the primary 
accountability of guarantors and the secondary accountability of contributors (Rennie et al. 
[1997], pp. 582-3). 
 
 The last function is the most complex. Recall that the market function was a response to 
the need for private goods associated with research. What the CWSG proposal gives us is a 
family of statuses which are each apt to be treated as private goods. All we need to get the 
benefit of market mechanisms is a status associated with social recognition, meaning that 
associating social credit with the Contributor role is enough to get market mechanisms up and 
going. However, we might want to explore more complex systems that assigns differential 
recognition to the different roles. For example, we might motivate careful checking by 
associating the guarantor role with lots of social credit. 
 
Table 2: Functions of authorship, and their relation to the roles of the CWSG proposal. 
 
 Having distinguished these roles, we can resolve the puzzles from section 3. 
 
 
36 This is a demanding role, and in radically collaborative research it may be difficult or impossible to 
meet its demands (Winsberg et al. [2014],  Huebner et al. [2018]), leaving some papers without a 
guarantor. 
 Credit Accountability Credibility Speaker 
norms 
Market 
Contributor Primary Secondary Secondary  Primary 






Spokesperson Secondary   Defend or 
Retract 
Secondary 
Guarantor  Primary Primary  Secondary 
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 The first issue is how to deal with researchers who have put creditworthy labour into a 
project whose results they do not believe. Such individuals can be listed as contributors to the 
paper, but left off of the lists of writers and guarantors, to represent the fact that they do not 
want to be bound by the sincerity norm, or put their credibility behind the result. 
 
 The second issue concerned credibility manipulation. Credibility-motivated inclusion and 
exclusion can be easily represented in this framework, without confusing credibility and 
credit.37 If researchers wanted to parachute in a senior researcher, they can list them as a 
guarantor for the paper without including them as contributor. And if researchers wanted to 
downplay the credibility of some researchers, they could be contributors but not guarantors 
(giving their credibility a secondary role). 
 
 The third issue concerned how to represent the work of researchers who have contributed 
significant labour to a project, without being in a position to fulfil the norms associated with 
SPEAKER. This is simple: these researchers should only be listed as contributors. 
 
 The final issue concerned radically collaborative work, in which no individual can claim to 
know the results of research. The list of contributors for such research is unproblematic: we 
can list everyone who was involved in the research. The problem is that no-one seems in a 
good position to be listed as writer or guarantor. Here we have three options: the writer and 
guarantor slots could be left empty, the researchers could be compelled to do more work until 
some of them can play these roles, or these roles could be played by collective entities.38 
 
 A virtue of the proposal is that it makes the epistemically central features of publication 
extremely salient, lending itself to an open-ended pluralism that can represent diverse research 
cultures. This point is easiest to see by running through some examples of how this proposal 
can be applied to the research cultures of different disciplines: 
 
Humanities: we can represent the fact that one individual has done most of the work of 
reading and constructing an argument by listing them as sole writer, spokesperson, and 
guarantor, whilst recognising others’ contributions—which would normally be listed as 
acknowledgements—by including them as contributors. This is the model used by this 
paper. 
 
Laboratory science: we can include everyone who has put labour into the project as 
contributors, while the researchers who have done the work of pulling the paper together 
 
37 We might be skeptical about credibility-boosting exclusion, but we might think that there is 
something valuable about a credible researcher putting their reputation behind a paper to give it more 
credibility (Strevens [2006]). 
38 All roles might be played by groups: massively collaborative work might have collective 
contributors, crowd-written papers might have a collective writer (Tomlinson et al. [2012]), and 
papers produced established labs might have a collective spokesperson, and hold the lab collectively 
accountable. 
22 
can be listed as a writer, and the laboratory head can be listed as a guarantor for the whole 
project. 
 
High-energy physics: we can represent the membership list approach to authorship by 
including everyone who has contributed to the collaboration as an author. In addition, we 
would want to have information about who did the work of writing, who will act as 
spokesperson, and who should be held accountable.39 In this case, it may be that we want 
to hold the collaboration collectively accountable to ensure that it has good institutional 
practices. 
 
Crowdsourced/co-produced research: we can recognise the labour of a large group of 
people by including them as contributors, without assigning the epistemic responsibilities 
associated with writer, spokesperson, and guarantor, which will presumably be associated 
with the researchers who designed and implemented the project. 
 
The CSWG proposal doesn’t give a recipe for determining who should play what role for a 
given paper; it provides a set of tools for research groups to write their own recipes in a way 
that is perspicuous and reflects their distinctive epistemic cultures. 
 
 It is worth highlighting the differences between the CWSG proposal, the ICJME guidelines, 
and the CRediT system. The ICJME guidelines present four individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for authorship: 
 
1. Substantial contributions to the conception or design of the work; or the acquisition, 
analysis, or interpretation of data for the work; 
2. Drafting the work or revising it critically for important intellectual content; 
3. Final approval of the version to be published; 
4. Agreement to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related 
to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and 
resolved. 
 
The idea is that we can extend the properties associated with single authorship to all co-authors 
of a collaboratively produced work, making collective authorship into a distributive property 
(Moffatt [2013], Wray [2018]). In our terminology, the properties associated with authorship 
are 1) ‘substantial’ creditworthy contribution, 2) input into the writing process, 3) being subject 
to the sincerity norm, and 4) being held individually accountable for the whole of the work. 
While the CWSG proposal would allow for an assignment of roles that approximated this 
arrangement—where all contributors are also writers, and guarantors—it is much more 
flexible. We might worry that the ICJME proposal forces a particular model of collaboration 
on researchers, whereas the CWSG proposal can accommodate diverse research cultures. If a 
 
39 High-energy physics has flexible practices for speaking for a collaboration, and the same research 
may be presented by many different researchers, depending on their need for ‘exposure’ (Knorr 
Cetina [1999], pp. 168-9). 
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group have researchers have produced a paper through a division of labour across these 
different conditions, according to the ICJME guidelines no-one should be listed as an author 
of the paper (Moffatt 2013). 
 
 Another salient point of difference is the requirement for ‘significant’ contributions. We 
don’t have a good account of what significance is, and I suspect that it is often used as a get-
out to get the desired people onto the byline (a similar get-out is to treat these conditions as 
individually sufficient for authorship). The CWSG proposal is compatible with various 
different accounts of the Contributor role, and leaves open the question of how best to represent 
credit-worthy work in an inclusive way. 
 
 The CRediT proposal proposes to distinguish the different authors of a paper by slotting 
them into a ‘controlled vocabulary’ of roles. These roles distinguish different kinds of 
contribution, and are designed to reduce conflicts about byline position, while displaying 
important information about research process.40 A first problem is that this proposal doesn’t 
have anything to say about the responsibilities associated with authorship, focusing exclusively 
on CREDIT (making it a version of strategy 1 above). This means that the proposal does 
nothing to address the problem cases from section 3. A second problem is that following the 
CRediT guidelines requires a lot of work to keep track of who did what in research. In large-
scale collaborations it may be simply impractical to gather this information (CERN doesn’t 
even gather information about who worked on particular paper). The CWSG proposal allows 
us to vary the amount of information about contributors depending on its value. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Discussions of authorship often note how confusing authorship practices are. In this paper I 
have made the case that authorship practices are not simply confusing: authorship itself is 
incoherent. If we want authorship to play all of the functions associated with it, then we will 
get inconsistent predictions about who to assign as an author. We can either do away with these 
functions, or do away with authorship. I have suggested that we take the second option, and 
have offered a revisionary proposal – the CWSG proposal – which replaces authorship with 
the roles of contributor, writer, spokesperson, and guarantor, dividing up these functions 
between the different roles. 
 
 It is important to own the limitations of this proposal. It is aimed at the conceptual problems 
with authorial practices, and it does not address its many practical problems, such as conflicts 
about authorial status, problematic incentive structures, and how to represent complex 
collaborative work. That said, the flexibility of the CWSG proposal offers tools to make 
progress on these questions. We should understand the CWSG proposal as a conceptual tool 
 
40 The full list is: conceptualization, data curation, formal analysis, funding acquisition, investigation, 
methodology, project administration, resources, software, supervision, validation, visualization, 
writing  (original draft), and writing (editing and reviewing) (CRediT [2018]), (MozillaScience 
[2018]). 
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for dividing up the epistemic properties associated with authorship, and not as a recipe for 
determining who goes where on a byline. 
 
 What we should want is a non-exclusionary practice that is easy to use without 
disagreement, fairly allocates credit, properly distributes epistemic responsibilities, enables 
useful credibility judgements, facilitates practices of accountability, and creates a market that 
incentivises good research. The best—and perhaps only—way to design a practice that fulfils 
these desiderata is to have an open and interdisciplinary conversation between researchers from 
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